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Abstract—Power and ancillary service markets are strongly
coupled. However, at the moment auctions are organized in such
a manner that the coupling is not taken into account. Every
market participant submits bids at power and/or AS markets
without possibility to adjust with respect to the outcome of the
other market. Inexact approximations of the actual market price
induce deviations from the optimal social welfare value.
In this paper, we ﬁrstly describe and analyze the consequences
of power and ancillary service market coupling. Secondly, we
present two different market design strategies, both of which
are based on the idea of iterative auction and have the goal
to optimally account for power and AS coupling, enabling the
overall system to maximize its social welfare.
An illustrative example is used to present potential beneﬁts and
downsides that might arise as a result of introducing proposed
market arrangements.
I. NOMENCLATURE
Ji is an objective function in a node i, i = 1, . . . , n
μi denotes a probability of activating allocated reserves,
0 ≤ μi ≤ 1
p := col(p1, . . . , pn) is a vector1 of power injections;
depending on the sign it can represent produced (+)
or consumed (-) power
a := col(a1, . . . , an) is a vector of allocated reserve
power; always positive
Areq is a required amount of reserves in a control zone
p := col(p1, . . . , pn) is a suitably deﬁned vector of max-
imal power injections at the nodes
p := col(p1, . . . , pn) is a vector of minimal power injec-
tions at the nodes
p∗ := col(p∗1, . . . , p
∗
n) is a vector of optimal nodal power
injections
a∗ := col(a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n) is a vector of optimal nodal reserve
power allocations
λPi(pi)is a bid of a BRPi2 to power market
λAi(ai)is a bid of a BRPi to AS market
λ
(k)
P is a global power price in iteration k
λ
(k)
A is a global AS price in iteration k
II. INTRODUCTION
A stable, reliable and economically efﬁcient electric energy
supply plays a crucial role in every modern society. The
1We use col(x1, . . . , xn) to denote the column vector
(
x1 . . . xn
).
2BRP stands for “Balance responsible party” and is a market participant
acting on both, power and ancillary service, markets.
liberalization of electricity markets started a few decades ago
with the goal of improving the economic efﬁciency of power
systems (by this, we mean increasing the social welfare, i.e.,
the sum of beneﬁts for producers and consumers). Compared
to other commodities, power has several speciﬁc character-
istics. To name a few: i) the inability of efﬁciently storing
large energy quantities, which, as a consequence, leads to
ii) the necessity of meeting the demand by production in
real-time (power balancing); and iii) the lower demand price-
elasticity of power as a commodity. For all these reasons,
power markets differ from standard markets, making their
design a challenging topic.
To facilitate real-time power balancing, other than power
markets, another type of markets was created - ancillary
services (AS) markets. On these markets, participants are
paid for availability and/or3 producing more (or less) power
than contracted to assist the system operation. Power and AS
markets are strongly coupled and actions taken on one of the
markets affect the other. The coupling comes from the fact
that both commodities, power and AS, are provided by the
same set of units that have certain production and consumption
limits. Coupling also results from using the same limited
transmission system in which power ﬂows obey the laws of
physics (Kirchoff’s law) and are, in general, not controllable.
Conventional day-ahead power markets are based on col-
lecting 24 hour power production and consumption proﬁles
from all participants, i.e., balance responsible parties (BRP).
We deﬁne a BRP as the only entity allowed to participate in
power and AS markets. These power proﬁles are discrete in
time, i.e., they are divided into a number of program time units
(PTU). After all BRPs bid their offers or needs, one entity, a
power exchange (PX), aggregates them in one common power
supply and one common power demand curve and clears the
market. Afterwards, BRPs can offer their spare capacity to
a transmission system operator (TSO) on AS markets and
thus potentially earn more money.4 Therefore, power and AS
markets are, at the moment, organized in such a way that each
BRP has to submit two independent bids, not knowing the
3In the majority of current arrangements, participants are paid only for
producing (reducing) extra power; however, there are some countries, such as
Norway, in which they are rewarded not only for producing more (or less)
than contracted, but also for being available.
4Bids can afterwards be slightly changed on an intra-day power market,
but this is outside the scope of this paper.
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result of one market when bidding for the other. This means
that during the bidding phase, the coupling of power and AS
markets is not taken into account neither on a BRP (local) nor
on a global level.
It is indisputable that introducing markets in power systems
has increased economic efﬁciency, see e.g. [1]. Still, it has
been recognized that, due to the above explained independence
of submitting bids, the markets designed in the current manner
do not necessarily reach optimal economic efﬁciency[2]. In
other words, current arrangements for power trading do not,
in general, guarantee reaching the optimal social welfare value,
even under conditions of perfect market competition when
BRPs bid their marginal costs. This is due to necessary
approximations that market participants have to make while
submitting the bids to power and AS markets. So far, the
research that aimed at solving the implications induced by
market coupling, concentrated on bidding strategies. On the
other hand, the research that aimed at increasing the social
welfare investigated optimization techniques, but not in the
view of iterative market auctions [3], [4], [5]. One of the
ﬁrst papers that proposed iterative decentralized markets is
[6]. There, the authors describe a decentralized market pool
auction for real and reactive power. However, in their work,
the coupling of energy and AS markets is not considered.
In this paper, we present the results of a study on possibili-
ties of increasing the economic efﬁciency of power markets by
changing the way of bidding. We investigated the beneﬁts of
introducing iterative markets to overcome the BRP’s problems
of making approximations that prevent the overall system from
reaching the optimal point. We proposed and compared two
different market structures for solving the problem, which is
formalized in Section III, both based on the idea of iterative
markets and presented in detail in Section IV-C and Sec-
tion IV-B. Our preliminary results show that iterative markets
are well worth exploring in more detail as their introduction
would eliminate the effects of errors in prediction of market
outcomes for BRPs. It would also increase the overall social
welfare.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The problem under consideration is given in Problem III.1
and is referred as ”optimal power and reserve dispatch”
(OPRD) problem.
Problem III.1 The Optimal Power and Reserve Dispatch
(OPRD) Problem
min
p,a
J(p, a) = min
p,a
n∑
i=1
Ji(pi, ai), (1)
subject to:
n∑
i=1
pi = 0 (2a)
n∑
i=1
ai ≥ Areq (2b)
pi + ai ≤ pi ≤ pi − ai, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (2c)
ai ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (2d)
where Ji(pi, ai) = (1− μi)(αip2i + βipi) + μi[αi(pi + ai)2 +
βi(pi + ai)]. 
The objective function Ji is assumed to be a convex function.
In case BRPi in a node i is a producer, Ji represents the
corresponding production cost. In case BRPi in a node i is
a consumer, Ji is the corresponding negated beneﬁt function.
Note here that J , as deﬁned above, has an interpretation of a
social welfare function.
For the sake of simplicity, we have chosen μi to be
a parameter that indicates the probability of activating all
allocated reserves. Such a choice of μi implies that, with
respect to activating allocated reserves, there are only two
possible cases considered: i) reserves are not activated at all,
or ii) reserves are activated, and they are activated in their full
allocated amount. Constraint (2a) denotes the power balance
requirement, while (2b) means that there should always be a
sufﬁcient amount of reserves, Areq, in the system. The amount
Areq is chosen to be deterministic and known in advance, as
it is in current market arrangements5. Equation (2c) states that
every producer or consumer has production (and consumption)
capacity limits, i.e., there are bounds on power injections in
each node. Constraints (2d) come from another simpliﬁcation
of the presentation. Note that in (2d) we have assumed the
symmetry between the up-regulating AS and down-regulating
AS. In a more general setting, the up-regulating limit and
down-regulating limit can be different, and up-regulating and
down-regulating actions can be treated as different commodi-
ties in AS markets. Results presented in this study can be
easily generalized in that direction.
The OPRD problem can be seen as a variation of the optimal
power ﬂow problem (see e.g. [7], [8] or [1]), where now we
deal with the allocation of both, power and AS at the same
time. Tie-line constraints are here not taken into account, and
the transmission system is considered to be robust enough
and to have sufﬁcient transmission capacity. In this study,
we are concerned with one PTU of ahead markets only, and,
therefore, time is not a variable in the considered problem
formulation. Furthermore, each BRP is seen as a price taker,
i.e., the inﬂuence of its bid is such that it cannot signiﬁcantly
change market outcomes and the global price of commodities.
Through the rest of this paper we assume that there is one
BRP in each node, and we use terms ”node” and ”BRP”
interchangeably.
5TSO calculates this amount.
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A. Coupling of Power and AS markets
With the abbreviation x := [pa], it is trivial to rewrite
the objective function (1) of the OPRD problem in matrix form
J(x) = xHx + fx
with H =
[
Cn Dn
Dn Dn
]
, where Cn := diag(α1, . . . , αn),
Dn := diag(μ1α1, . . . , μnαn); and f =
[β1, . . . , βn, μ1β1, . . . , μnβn]. The above representation
is a standard quadratic programming (QP) representation.
The OPRD problem is suitable for QP solvers [9] under the
assumption that all parameters, including conﬁdential data
that deﬁne cost and beneﬁt functions, are known to some
central entity. In a liberalized, market-based power systems,
this is not the case. In this paper we treat the solution to
the centralized QP-based OPRD problem as a reference for
comparison with other proposed solutions.
The iterative bidding algorithms explained in Section IV-B
and Section IV-C are devised with the aim that their solu-
tions coincide with the solution of the work presented in
Section III-B. When conﬁdentiality, computing power and
communication do not pose any constraints in ﬁnding a
solution; the results obtained using a QP solver are the best
solution achievable, and a ”golden standard” for all the other
solutions of the OPRD problem. In the remainder of the paper,
we refer to it as the ”golden standard” (GS) of the OPRD
problem for the aforementioned reasons.
In practice different solution approaches have to be con-
sidered to cope with any assumption that cannot be fulﬁlled.
For example, market organization can avoid dealing at some
central level with conﬁdentiality, distributed solution can cope
with computing power and/or communication limitations, and
also in certain cases with conﬁdentiality issues.
In current market designs, BRPs have in principle one
chance only to submit the bids for power and AS. To create
these bids, due to coupling of power and AS markets, it
is necessary to make assumptions on market outcome, i.e.,
realized prices on both markets. It is reasonable to assume that
each BRP would be able to make bids for both, power and
AS markets, that are economically more efﬁcient (”better”) if
it was known in advance what the realized price on at least
one of these markets would be.
The outcome of one market inﬂuences the outcome of the
other market. Every bid curve is a result of a market outcome
prediction, and, therefore; it depends on the forecast error. In
turn, this error induces changes in the market clearing prices.
Consequently, even in the conditions of perfect competition,
the clearing prices cannot guarantee that the maximum of the
social welfare is reached.
The challenge is to ﬁnd new strategies that solve the
above indicated problems. While doing so, it should also
be kept in mind that conﬁdentiality requirements, and not
only necessary estimations from local level, pose serious
burdens to the system. One possibility to overcome the above
described difﬁculties is to create iterative markets. Iterative
market arrangements not only remove the requirement that
one single entity knows all the conﬁdential data to reach the
optimum, but also facilitate making approximations and enable
BRPs making much better bids in each step of iteration.
We present two approaches for designing iterative markets.
One design strategy is completely based on the dual decompo-
sition and subgradient methods. It considers iterative bidding
of amounts of power, pi, and AS, ai, for globally given prices
λP and λA. We refer to this approach as the ”point bid-based
iterative market” (PBM), and we present it in some more detail
in Section IV-B. Alternative design strategy considers BRPs
bidding of complete λPi(pi) and λAi(ai) curves, similarly as
is done in the current practice, with the difference that that the
bidding is performed in several iterations for each PTU. We
refer to this approach as the ”curve bid-based iterative market”
(CBM), and we present it in detail in Section IV-C.
B. Golden Standard for Solutions of the OPRD Problem
The quadratic programming problem is a special, widely-
known class of optimization problems; and the theory, in-
cluding solution methods, and algorithms for QP problems
are highly developed. It is a subclass of a more general
class, convex optimization problems6. Once the problem is
formulated in such a manner that it ﬁts in the framework of
convex optimization, there is a number of available convex
optimization solvers that can be applied to solve it. The QP
solver ﬁnds the optimal solution when the full knowledge of
all the parameters of the objective function and constraints.
IV. ITERATIVE MARKET ARRANGEMENTS
A. Dual decomposition
We present the market-based solution of the OPRD problem
based on the Lagrangian relaxation. The constraints of the
OPRD problem can be grouped into local and global con-
straints. Local constraints exist on a BRP level and all informa-
tion needed for their satisfaction can be collected locally. An
example of this type of constraints are lower and upper power
production limits given by (2c). Equation (2d) also deﬁnes
a local constraint. Global constraints, also called coupling or
complicating constraints, are constraints that connect all pro-
ducers and consumers in one system. For example, the power
balance requirement, (2a), or requirement for certain amount
of reserves in the system, (2b), are global constraints. Since,
in a competitive market environment, it is highly unlikely that
BRPs will share their local information with any other entity,
the OPRD problem should be decomposed and solved in such
a way that each BRP autonomously optimizes its own costs,
while the overall system still reaches the global optimum. To
accomplish this goal, we dualize only the coupling constraints
by employing dual decomposition [10] and subgradient [11]
methods. Decomposition not only removes the requirement for
sharing the sensitive data but also signiﬁcantly decreases the
computational complexity. The partial Lagrangian consists of
6Note that this is the case only if H deﬁned in Section III-A is H  0
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the global objective function (1) and global constraints (2a)
and (2b), and is given by:
L(p, a, λP , λA) :=
n∑
i=1
Ji(pi, ai)− λP
(
n∑
i=1
pi
)
−λA
(
n∑
i=1
ai −Areq
)
. (3)
The Lagrange multipliers λP and λA have an interpretation of
global prices for energy and AS, respectively. Lagrange dual
problem is given by:
max
λP ,λA
l(λP , λA) (4)
subject to
λA ≥ 0, (5)
where l(λP , λA) is the dual objective function deﬁned as
follows
l(λP , λA) := min
p,a
{L(p, a, λP , λA)}
subject to (2c) and (2d).
For ﬁxed λP , λA, it is straightforward to decompose the
dual function (4) and, as a result obtain n decoupled local op-
timization problems, where each local optimization problem,
which is deﬁned as follows, is assigned to one node only.
Problem IV.1 Local Optimization Problem
Given the prices λP and λA, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the local
optimization problem is given by
min
pi,ai
gi(λP , λA), (6)
subject to:
pi + ai ≤ pi ≤ pi − ai, (7a)
ai ≥ 0, (7b)
where objective function is deﬁned as gi(λP , λA) :=
Ji(pi, ai)− λP pi − λAai. 
For given λP and λA, the minimizers p∗i and a
∗
i of the Local
Optimization Problem (Problem IV.1) are the optimal values
of power and AS in a node i.
The maximizers of the dual problem (4), λ∗P and λ
∗
A,
are the optimal market prices for power and AS. For the
optimal market prices, power balance constraint and, (2a), and
constraint on amount of AS, (2b), are necessarily satisﬁed [10],
[12].
B. Point Bid-Based Iterative Market (PBM)
1) Formal representation: If we assume transparent mar-
kets, with prices λP and λA that are publicly (globally)
available, the Problem IV.1 is easily solved by a QP solver.
Since the dual function is, in general, not a smooth function
in λP and λA, gradient methods are not applicable and,
therefore; subgradient methods are to be used.
λ
(k+1)
P = λ
(k)
P − ρ(k)P
(
n∑
i=1
pi
)
(8a)
λ
(k+1)
A = max(0, λ
(k)
A − ρ(k)A
(
n∑
i=1
ai −Areq
)
) (8b)
Step sizes, ρ(k)P and ρ
(k)
A , are chosen in such a way that
convergence is obtained, see e.g. [11] or [12] for more detail
and proofs. They can be constant or can change in each
iteration. The convergence of subgradient methods is proven in
[11] for several choices of step size, e.g. for constant step size,
ρk = ρ > 0. Some other step size examples for which con-
vergence is guaranteed are series ρk = qr+k , q > 0, r ≥ 0,
and ρk = q√k , q > 0. The difference in prices between two
iterations k and k + 1 for both commodities, power and AS,
is used as a stopping criterion. When these values fall below
certain predeﬁned threshold , the auction is stopped. Theoret-
ically, the dual variables, i.e. the prices, are not monotonously
converging. Still, this stopping criterion has been chosen as it
is of the practical value for the implementation.
Algorithm (PBM)
repeat until the stopping criterion is satisﬁed:
i) Solve n local problems (Problem IV.1) for ﬁxed global
parameters λ(k)P and λ
(k)
A calculated in the iteration k, or
for given initial global parameters, i.e., prices λ(0)P and
λ
(0)
A
ii) Update prices according to (8a) and (8b)
2) Implementation: The iterative point bidding method
starts with a market operator7 announcing the initial prices
for power and ancillary services (initial conditions): λ(0)P and
λ
(0)
A . Given these prices, each BRP (i = 1 . . . n) maximizes its
proﬁt. This corresponds to solving optimization subproblems,
i.e., local objective functions, as deﬁned in Problem IV.1, for
given ﬁxed prices for power and ancillary services. Results
of these optimization algorithms, that is, optimal power and
AS amounts of each BRP, are then bade again and a market
operator announces a new set of prices. The process is repeated
until the stopping criterion is satisﬁed.
Although, the algorithm is proven to converge, it might
happen that the convergence is very slow, i.e., that the optimum
is reached after large number of iterations. Moreover, even
though the global constraints are satisﬁed in the optimal point,
there is no guarantee that they are also satisﬁed in every
iteration. This means that it is not possible to stop the process
of optimization, i.e., the bidding iterations, before the optimum
is reached. In case of doing so, it might happen that the
markets will not be cleared, and there will be a scheduled
7By market operator, we mean PX for power markets and TSO for AS
markets. Our problem formulation enables them to be one entity or separated
entities, as long as they are synchronized in time and publish clearing results
simultaneously.
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power imbalance, insufﬁcient amount of AS, or both. This
may impose a serious practical implementation issue for this
market clearing strategy and is also the reason why we propose
another iterative market clearing approach.
C. Curve Bid-Based Iterative Market (CBM)
1) Formal representation: The OPRD problem can be
solved in another way, with BRPs bidding not only optimal
amounts of power or AS, but the whole price - power proﬁles,
λPi(pi) and λAi(ai). The core idea still comes from the
decomposition methods, but the algorithm itself is slightly
modiﬁed. Same as before, the OPRD problem is decomposed
in n smaller, simpler problems given by Local Optimization
Problem IV.1. Optimal values p∗i and a
∗
i are calculated as a
result of each of these optimizations. Unlike in PBM, BRPs
now do not bid only these values, but each of them calculates
its own optimal bid curve for both markets as follows:
λi(pi) =
∂Ji(pi, a∗i )
∂pi
(9a)
λi(ai) =
∂Ji(p∗i , ai)
∂ai
. (9b)
While calculating the new bid, each BRP takes care of its
own production limits, as expressed in (2c). Note that with
quadratic cost/beneﬁt functions, the slope of each BRP’s bid in
every iteration is the same, but the production (consumption)
low and high limits differ from one iteration to the other.
After optimal bids are calculated, bid curves for power and
AS markets are aggregated, the markets are cleared, and the
new clearing prices are announced. The process repeats till the
stopping criterion is satisﬁed.
In this paper, we present simulation results which indicate
that the proposed algorithm converges to the optimal point.
In some cases, however, the proposed algorithms runs into
infeasible problems. This might be due to small number
of BRPs that participate in the simulated market. Recursive
feasibility and further analytic treatment of the algorithm are
topics for future research.
Algorithm (CBM)
repeat until the stopping criterion is satisﬁed:
i) Calculate the optimal bids for this step (for ﬁxed
global parameters λ(k)P and λ
(k)
A calculated in the previous
iteration k, or for given initial global parameters, i.e.,
prices λ(0)P and λ
(0)
A ) according to (IV-C1)
ii) Sum up all bids for power and for AS and clear the
markets (i.e., calculate the prices for which constraints
(2a),(2b) are satisﬁed); update the prices
2) Implementation: It is straightforward to verify that in
each iteration all system constraints, local and global, are
satisﬁed. Because the procedure, which is in essence equal
to market clearing procedure, is done in each iteration step,
it is guaranteed that all the constraints are met. This fact has
the following advantageous practical implication: it is now
possible to break the execution of the iterative optimization
before actually reaching the optimum without violating the
system’s constraints.
In simulations it has been observed that in some cases,
depending on choice of initial prices or market outcome in
one of iterations, it could happen that ratio of prices is so
unfavorable for AS that there are not enough bids to clear the
AS market. This is due to taking local constraints into account
only on local and not as well global level. In that sense, this
algorithm is not robust.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Simulations are run in Matlab on a model of 12 nodes
devised from Table 1. of [13] where typical range of power
market parameters is listed. Simulations are run for several
cases, but only one of them is presented here as similar
conclusions hold for all of them. The simulation parameters
are given in Table I. In the presented case, the required amount
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
BRP α β pi pi
1 0.008 40.0 0 155
2 0.009 46.0 0 190
3 0.012 44.0 0 150
4 0.012 45.0 0 150
5 0.011 43.0 0 140
6 -0.008 50.0 -150 0
7 -0.010 48.0 -150 0
8 -0.011 47.0 -150 0
9 -0.014 49.0 -150 0
10 -0.012 47.5 -150 0
11 -0.008 50.0 -150 0
12 -0.015 47.0 -150 0
of reserves is chosen to be Areq = 120 and μ = 0.06 for all
BRPs. To facilitate the comparison of algorithms, the same
initial condition and stopping criterion are implemented in
both algorithms.
Optimal prices are calculated to be λ∗P = 46.68 and
λ∗A = 2.82. The results of the simulations of both market
arrangements (PBM and CBM), are given in Figure 1 and
Figure 2. First observation is that, indeed, both methods
converge to the real optimum, i.e., the solution obtained by GS.
PBM procedure reached the optimum after k = 116 iterations,
while it took only k = 16 iterations for CBM to ﬁnd it.
The PBM method has proven to be very sensitive to the
choice of the step size update ρ(k)P and ρ
(k)
A , see equation
(8a) and (8b). In case of choosing too small step size, the
convergence might be very slow, or, in case of too big param-
eters ρ(k)P and ρ
(k)
A , Lagrange multipliers, i.e. prices, could be
too oscillatory. The speed of convergence also depends on the
choice of initial prices.
However, while PBM has shown to be signiﬁcantly depen-
dant on choice of ρ(k)P and ρ
(k)
A which can lead to slowness
and oscillatory behavior, it has also proven to be more robust
with respect to choosing the initial prices compared to CBM.
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Fig. 1. Normalized prices for power and AS on PBM markets.
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Fig. 2. Normalized prices for power and AS on CBM markets.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied the interaction of power and AS
markets and investigated different approaches of integrating
these markets. It has been shown that in current market
auctions the optimal social welfare is, in general, not reached
even under conditions of the perfect market competition, and
that BRPs are not available to offer bids to the market in such
way that the maximal economic efﬁciency is achieved.
In this paper, we suggested and analyzed two new iterative
power and AS market designs. They are both based on decom-
position methods, with the important difference that in one
case (PBM) BRPs bid only optimal values of power and AS,
while in the other case (CBM) the the BRPs submit complete
curves that describe dependencies between power and price.
In the ﬁrst case, the global constraints are fulﬁlled only in
the optimal point. In the second case, all the constraints are
satisﬁed in every iteration and if the optimization is stopped
before actually reaching the optimum, the only property lost
is optimality itself.
Simulation results show some weak points of the PBM
design, such as possible slow convergence and great oscil-
lations in prices. Still, for this market design, convergence
is analytically proven, unlike that for the CBM design. The
CBM markets converge in the signiﬁcantly smaller number of
iterations, but on the downside, the method is sensitive to a
choice of the initial market prices. However, in both designs
the effects of errors in prediction of market outcome for BRPs
are removed and the overall social welfare is increased when
compared to today’s situation.
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